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The Judicial Mind1 is the major attempt by the acknowledged dean
of judicial behavioralists to explain both scientifically and unconven-
tionally how Supreme Court Justices decide cases.2 The commitment
to a political science of judicial behavior is based on the premises that
scientific social study is possible and that traditional constitutional
scholarship is "discursive commentary" 3 which misses the real factors
behind judicial decision, By scientific study, exponents mean research
guided by an explicit theory, posing hypotheses with mathematical
precision and objectivity which may be tested against real world evi-
dence by an independent researcher.4 The Judicial Mind has received
critical commendation for its analytical sophistication and novel con-
clusions, and has been hailed as a vindication of the genre.5
If they were not putatively rooted in a scientific analysis, Schubert's
conclusions would seem modest. The summary findings are that the
Justices who have sat on the Supreme Court since 1946 show a consis-
tency of decision during their careers, that blocs of Justices may be
identified by their responses to certain types of issues, and that the bloc
with the greatest influence in any given term can be determined.
Three blocs are most significant-the liberals (including Justices Black,
Douglas, and Warren), the conservatives (including Justices Burton,
Reed, and Vinson), and a moderating group referred to as "the prag-
1. G. SCHUBERT, Ti JUDICIAL MIND (1965) thereinafter cited as SCUBE~R].
2. Schubert is Professor of Political Science at the University of North Carolina. lie
has written or edited six other books including QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BE-
HAVIOR (1959), CONSTITUTIONAL PoLrrxcs (1960), and JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR, A RVADEA IN
THEORY AND RESEARCH (ed. 1964), For an introduction to the literature of judicil be-
havior, see also the symposium Social Science Approaches to the Judicial Process, 79 MARV.
L REV. 1551 (1966).
3. SCHUBERT 10.
4. This meaning is used, for example, by Danelski, Values As Variables in Judicial
Decision-Making: Notes Toward a Theory, 19 VAND. L. REV. 721, 722 (1966).
5. Westin, Book Review, 61 Abf. POL. Sci. REV. 763 (1967); Jacob, Book Review, 1966




matic conservatives" 7 (including Justices Frankfurter, Goldberg, Jack-
son, and Stewart8, who are relatively liberal on political issues and
relatively conservative on economic ones). During the early fifties, the
liberal bloc was in the minority. By the mid-fifties, Chief Justice War-
ren had joined the liberals and the Court began again to advance
egalitarian policies in citizenship, legislative reapportionment, and
racial integration cases, as it had during the 194648 terms when Jus-
tices Murphy and Rutledge sat. Egalitarianism became the value of
greatest Court consensus in contrast to the continued divisions over
economic and civil liberties issues.0
Schubert claims, however, that he can do better than merely report
these trends in judicial politics. He can show scientifically that mere
doctrinal explanations of judicial decision are inadequate. Schubert
hypothesizes that two values or preferences are most influential in deter-
mining how a Justice decides a case. Therefore an analysis relating
decisions to these values best explains judicial behavior. The first value
is one of choice between the claims of "the economically affluent and
the economically underprivileged' 0 (the economic underdog or "E,
value). The second is the choice between governmental authority and
claims of private citizens "to personal (as distinguished from property)
rights and freedoms," (the civil liberty or "C" value).n One of these
two value choices, Schubert believes, is raised by the facts of most cases
submitted to the Court. Initially, several values may have been present
in the case, but either the "C" or "E" value is usually sifted out as cru-
cial to the decision through the Court's "jurisdictional screening."'-
Merely by reading the headnotes of the reported opinions, one can
identify the key value in each case. By focusing on those cases with dis-
senting opinions one can determine how the Justices in any single term
rank according to a liberal or conservative commitment to these
values. 3 Schubert's scientific theory of judicial decision may, in the
author's own words, be analogized to presenting to the Justices a pref-
erence questionnaire:
Each case asks the justices to respond to the question: is your
attitude toward value X sufficiently favorable that you believe that
7. Id. 274.
8. Id. 270-77. The composition of each bloc is not set forth explicitly in the tcxt. It
must be drawn, approximately, from table 41 and from figure 16. Scatmr 270-71.




13. The ranking technique is called scaling and is described Ehortly.
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a claim of degree Y should be upheld? (For example: Is your atti-
tude toward political freedom sufficiently favorable that you be-
lieve that a witness before a congressional investigating committee
cannot "constitutionally" be compelled to reveal his past associ-
ations, if any, with the Communist Party of the United States?)1 4
To justify this approach, Schubert relies on a statistical technique
developed by mathematical psychologists called scaling.1 To scale is
to order or rank people according to their expression of or commit-
ment to a specific value. For example, assume that ten cases are pre-
sented to the Supreme Court, all raising the primary issue of whether
or not petitioner's right to free expression should be restrained to
achieve a valid state interest. Assume that all Justices agree that this
is the sole issue for decision. Assume further that there is at least some
disagreement among the Justices as to how to decide each case. Given
these plausible assumptions, one could rank the Justices by assigning
a positive or negative weight to their "votes" for or against free expres-
sion, with all votes favoring free expression weighed positively. If we
selected actual cases decided in the late fifties, we would expect Justice
Douglas and Black to be ranked high on the scale, with high positive
scores, and Justices Burton and Clark to be ranked at the bottom of
the scale, with high negative scores. Similarly the ten cases could be
ranked downward from those in which free expression is approved
only by Justice Douglas, or by Justices Douglas and Black, to those in
which it is disapproved only by Justice Clark or by Justices Burton
and Clark. If Justices always perceive the same value, if they each give
that value a constant weight and do not vary their value commitment
over time, it should be possible, theoretically, to rank Justices and cases
with very few inconsistencies-that is, with very few cases in which
Justices Burton or Clark uphold free expression while Justices Douglas
and Black restrict it. The data for Schubert's analysis come from the
construction of such scales for each of two "values," the "C" or civil
liberties value and the "E" or economic underdog value, for each term
of the Court from 1946 to 1963.10
Schubert finds that each scale does demonstrate a high rate of con-
sistency when tested by the mathematical conventions deemed the
14. SCHUBERT 75.
15. Schubert assumes that the reader is familiar with the technique. He does not ap-
praise its appropriateness, though he does refer to a discussion in one of his earlier books.
Id. 75. See G. SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BMIAVIOR 269-90 (1959). The
technique was developed by Louis Guttman and was originally presented in S. STouFFER
et al., THE AMERICAN SOLDIER: STUDIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN WORLD NVAW II (1950).
16. ScHUBERT 104-12, 130-38.
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appropriate test statistics for consistency. 27 He interprets this consis-
tency as proving that the subjective expression of the two values, inde-
pendent of legal doctrine, is what really determines how the cases are
decided. Though this is not clearly set forth, he seems to assume that
there is no room in a traditional (non-social science) view of the law
for such values to be taken into explicit account. To him, the tradi-
tional view stands for neutral rules, merciless logic, and lifeless prece-
dent-a Bleak House formalism. s The fact that the two values scale,
he believes, proves that they exist. If they exist, and if there is no place
for them in legal doctrine, they must have a personal, meta-doctrinal
influence on decision. Schubert does not say that the Justices themselves
are unaware of the impact of their personal values, only that the Jus-
tices would have the public think that personal values do not play so
great a part in the law as in fact they do. "[I]t seems evident," Schubert
says, "that the whole point of the opinion-writing ritual is to provide
acceptable rationales which will protect the justices from personal criti-
cism-and even from personal responsibility-for their decisions."10
The Judicial lind may be critized from two vantage points.
Methodologically, the scales are biased and it is doubtful that there is
any economic underdog value which ranks consistently. Jurispruden-
tially, Schubert's characterization of the traditional view of legal deci-
sion ignores the now commonplace appreciation of the role played by
values in the formulation of legal principles and policies.
I have checked the reliability of the C and E scales by applying
their defining criteria independently to cases reported for the year
1957. This was the year which Schubert investigated first and the year
in which he found "the highest consistency in voting behavior toward
economic issues for the entire period of seventeen terms."20 The repli-
17. Schubert uses two test statistics, the coeffident of reproducibility (CR) and the
coefficient of scalability (CS). For the 1957 terms, the test statistics are: C scale : CR = .939,
CS = .838; E scale : CR = .989, CS = .902. CR is equal to 1 minus the fraction made up
by the number of inconsistencies in each table divided by the number of cases in w'hich
there is a 7-2, 6-3 or 54 split, times the nine Justices. A CR greater than .90 is considered
a proof of consistency. CS is equal to 1 minus the fraction made up by dividing the number
of inconsistencies by the number of minority votes cast in all the cases. A CS greater than
.60-.65 is considered a proof of consistency. For the theory behind these admittedly
arbitrary ratios, see G. SCHUMERT, QUANTrIATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEIAVIOR 270-72(1959); SCHUBERT 78-83. Schubert's tables for the 1957 term are reproduced in summary
form in the appendix infra.
18. Eg., Schubert's reference to the "Personal foundations of judicial decisions,"
SCHmUERT 7, to be contrasted with the "lawyer's model of judicial decision-making, which
is based upon traditional logic and depends upon the stare decisis norm for its deus ex
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cation shows that the economic value does not scale, and that the civil
liberty value does-though less consistently than Schubert claims."1
Comparison of the E scales shows that Schubert included seven cases
that I ignored 2 2 and I included three cases that he left out.23 In three
others--all labor cases-we read the economic underdog value oppo-
sitely.24 Schubert also multiple counted, repeating six cases by counting
separately eight companion cases decided on the same day, on the same
issue, on the same or similar facts, disposed of by the same written
opinion. Since none of the companion cases contained any inconsistent
votes, the effect of the extra counting was to increase the denominators
of the scalability ratios, biasing the tables toward consistency. 2 Where
Schubert found an unusually high degree of scalability, I found no evi-
dence of consistent voting with respect to the economic value.2
Closer consideration of a few cases suggests the weakness of Schubert's
three analytical assumptions: (1) that the Justices filter out a single
issue for decision, (2) that they agree on the primary value which this
issue represents, and (3) that Schubert can tap this value reliably in
building his scales.
21. For my replications of the C and E scales for the 1957 term, see appendix itifra,
The test statistics are: C scale: CR = .937, CS = .810; E scale: CR = .836, CS - .1517.
22. Carpenters Local 1976 v. NLRB, 857 U.S. 93 (1958) (hot-cargo provision held tin.
enforceable); three price discrimination cases-FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 855 U.S. 896
(1958), Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958) and Federal Maritime Bd.
v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958) (in none of these was it clear to me that either the
public or smaller competitors gained from the rulings, nor could I decide which of these
would be the underdog); Allegheny Corp. v. Breswick & Co., 355 U.S. 415 (1958) (dealt
with a question of federal jurisdiction unrelated to any underdog), United States v. Mc.
Ninch, 356 U.S. 595 (1958) (merely construed the Federal False Claims Act narrowly to
limit criminal prosecution); and Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Flee. Coop., 356 U.S. 525
(1958) (where the underdog value hardly seems predominant, see p. 1437 infra).
23. ICC v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 355 U.S. 175 (1957) (supposedly aiding the consumer
by lowering iron prices); Public Utilities Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958)
(local California carriers gaining some of my sympathy); and Hanson v. Denckla, 857 US.
235 (1958) (favoring out-of-state banks and insurance companies against widows and
pensioners).
24. In International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958) and in United
Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958), I took the worker suing his union as
the underdog. Schubert wrestled, but saw it the other way. ScHUBEar 168. The third case
was Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 US. 131 (1957) in which union picketing was saved
from a lower court injunction. If Schubert were consistent in seeing unions as the under-
dog interest, he should have found the dissenting Justices Black, Douglas, and Warren
as the conservatives here.
25. Schubert offers no reason for his multiple counting other than a definitional one
-he counts each case with a unique docket number. ScaMtr 46. For the multiple count.
hags, see Schubert's E table. ScHUaRT 130-38. All but one show up as repeated citations
differentiated by docket numbers after the colons. The other repeater is NLRB v. Millk
Drivers Locals 338 & 680, 357 U.S. 345 (1958), a companion case to Carpenters Local 1976
v. NLRB, supra note 22.
26. Schubert's CR was .989 and his CS .902 for the E scale; my CR was .836, and my
CS was .517 (see appendix infra); Schubert's figures meet and exceed the conventional test
for consistency; mine do not. See notes 17 and 21 supra and Scmiumr 104-12, 180-38.
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In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electrical Cooperative T an injured
employee who resided in North Carolina sued the respondent South
Carolina corporation for its alleged negligence. Byrd, the employee,
worked for a subcontractor of Blue Ridge. Compensation was sought
in the federal court of South Carolina. Blue Ridge raised the defense
that petitioner was its employee for the purposes of the South Carolina
Workmen's Compensation Act and that this state law provided Byrd's
exclusive remedy. The district court struck the defense and found for
Byrd; the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and di-
rected judgment for Blue Ridge. In overturning the Court of Appeals,
the Supreme Court held that regardless of state law the employee was
entitled in a federal court to have the factual issues raised by the de-
fense heard by a jury. Schubert read this case as if it pivoted on the
issue and value of who was the economic underdog. As an injured
employee undertaking judicial combat with a utility company, Byrd
might have drawn some sympathy. Clearly, however, there was more
than this at stake. Even in Schubert's idiosyncratic terms, there was
an issue of political rights-Byrd's right to a jury trial in a federal
court, where federal and forum state law conflicted. This would appear
to put the Byrd case more properly on the C scale. In context, it seems
most likely that the case turned on a third issue and value-the relative
applicability of federal and state law. A decade before, the Court
through Justice Frankfurter had ruled in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York2-
that state law must govern whenever its application to the case would
decisively determine its outcome. By applying federal law here, the
Court was significantly limiting the Guaranty rule.20
United States v. Cores,30 which Schubert places on the C scale,
turned on a question of venue in construing the Immigration and
Nationality Act. The majority held that an alien crewman who over-
stays his permitted period in the United States is guilty of a continu-
ing offense which may be prosecuted in any district in which he is
discovered. The dissenters interpreted the statute to limit jurisdiction
to the district where he was when the period expired. The case cannot
be reduced to a single issue turning on a single value. There are the
questions of whether or not deportation powers should be considered
27. 256 U.S. 525 (1958).
28. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
29. Yet a fourth value, raised in the case, is the relative competence of the Supreme
Court to overturn the factual findings of inferior courts. Justice Frankfurter understood
the Court of Appeals to be saying that even if a factual issue would have to be submitted
to a jury, in this case there were no controverted facts. 356 U.S. at 558.59.
30. 356 U.S. 405 (1958).
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penal and whether immigration enforcement powers should be nar-
rowly or broadly granted under the Congressional mandate. The value
of compassion for an alien and perhaps even the value of sympathy for
the underdog may both affect the answers to these questions. The one
value which seems least implied is the C scale value involving due
process or protection of a civil right.
One suspects either intuition or circularity on Schubert's part for
including Zavada v. United States3' on the C scale. No written opinion
is reported for the case, merely a note that the Court ordered the case
remanded for a hearing, that Justices Clark, Harlan, and Whittaker
dissented from the order, and that two earlier Supreme Court cases
were precedent for the disposition.32 No mention is made of the issue
decided or the facts of the trial. Nor does reference to an earlier report
of the case at the appellate level add information other than that one
ground for appeal had to do with the sentence imposed.33 How did
Schubert know that this case was decided on the basis of the C value?
Did he research the cases cited or did he just guess that this was a
criminal litigation and surmise that a Clark-Harlan-Whittaker alliance
usually means a division over a civil right in a criminal case? If this
reflects Schubert's reasoning his only basis for ranking the dissenters
negatively on the C scale was foreknowledge of their putative prefer-
ences. Then to use the C scale to prove the very values which are
assumed in constructing the scale is to reason in a circle.
There appears to be circularity as well in the way Schubert deter-
mines the values in the cases with reported opinions. He does not ex-
plain how he determines their presence beyond acknowledging that
it is a "subjective" process.34 It is likely that he relies on the factual
summaries, which give only a fraction of those facts that were submit-
ted by the parties prior to the decision. These factual summaries best
fit and reinforce the opinion's holding. Thus Schubert's values are
dependent upon and not anterior to the reasoning of the opinion.
Though the assumptions are weak, replication shows that the C scale
is significantly consistent.35 This supports the contention that the Just
31. 355 US. 392 (1958) (per curiam).
32. Walker v. Johnston, 312 US. 275 (1941); Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342 (1941).
These cases deal with appeals from the discharge of habeas corpus writs. The Wvaller
petition for the writ was based on denial of counsel. The Holiday petition was based on
the erroneous imposition of two sentences for a single offense. In both, the district judge
was required to hold, personally, a hearing with argument on the bases for the ivrits.
33. 245 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1957).
34. SCHUBEr 101.
35. Schubert finds a C scale CR of .96, a CS of .84. With seventeen fewer cases (Schu-
bert multiple counts twelve times and five others seemed misplaced in the C scale), I find
a CR of .94 and a CS of .81.
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tices have divergent views of the Constitution when it comes to issues
of civil liberties and that these differences often lead to split decisions.
This is not a fresh insight. Lawyers and students of the Court have
noted the alliances to which Schubert points, and have even ranked
the Justices in terms of their relative civil libertarianismaO Moreover,
although the technique may be original, it is wrong to take the fact
of scalability as scientific proof that conflict over a single value deter-
mines the outcome of cases, and wrong to see this value as separate and
outside of legal doctrine to the extent that it influences decisions. Civil
liberties cases involve more values than just the citizen's freedom from
governmental restriction: they also involve values raised by questions
about the relative competence of court and legislature, appellate and
trial courts, about proper jurisdiction between the federal and state
governments, about the suitability of a particular dispute to the making
of general rules, about fairness in criminal sentencing, and about the
judicial ripeness of a dispute. Justices will differ on all these issues,
and their different approaches and conclusions are reflected in the
rules and principles of our law.
It is widely accepted in American jurisprudence that law is more
than rules, that rules embody legal principles and legal policies and
that these principles and policies are based on social values or prefer-
ences. Supreme Court Justices constantly face disputes which present
value conflicts or in which the impact of these values is undear. Such
ambiguities give law what traditionalists refer to as its open texture.
But when a Justice resolves a conflict, he does so within the framework
of prior statutes and rulings which represent earlier efforts of past Jus-
36. See, e.g., the table compiled by The Commission of Law and Social Action of the
American Jewish Congress, showing how the Justices sitting in 1957 stood "on questions
of civil liberties."
Favorable Against No
to Right Right Vote
J. Douglas 56 1
J. Black 52 5
c. J. Warren 48 7 2
J. Brennan 48 7 2
J. Frankfurter 33 23 1
J. Whittaker 28 29
J. Harlan 27 so
J. Burton 22 34 1
J. Clark 16 41
The only variation between the ranking of this table and the C scale is th- reversed
order of Justices Whittaker and Harlan. Bischoff, Constitutional Law and Civil Rights,
1958 ANNUAL SURVEY op Azaaic. , Law 59, 60-61. See also the measure between pairs ofjustices in table IV(B), The Supreme Court 1957 Term, 72 HAnv. L. R"v. 77, 103.
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tices to resolve the same conflicts over ambiguities. What makes one
principle weightier than another is the contemporary acceptance of
the values it implies. Schubert's particular mistake is to see no connec-
tion between the written opinions and the values touched by a dispute.
Opinions are about values. They connect the decision about values
which are raised in the present case to prior efforts to accommodate
these values. If the prior decisions rest upon values now considered of
lesser importance and slight values now considered controlling, we
speak of the older law as being weak, or ripe for modification or
rejection.
Schubert's statement of his theory and presentation of his empirical
results occupy the first half of The Judicial Mind. The second half of
the book is a breathless uphill spiraling of unscientific conjecture
about judicial thinking. At bottom are the flawed assumptions about
what each case stands for. Above this are the C and E scales, subdivided
into smaller components and recombined.37 At the highest level, Schu-
bert intuits three key ideological factors or pure types of judicial
philosophy. Factor I is the value of egalitarianism. Factor II is the value
of freedom against authority. Factor III is the value of individual
versus collective interests. The justification for these three factors is,
in part, their correspondence with the major political doctrines of the
nineteenth century- Libert6, .galit6, and FraternitY.8 Factor I is later
redefined as the measure of liberalism and conservatism, and factors II
and III are combined and called the dimension of pragmatism and
dogmatism.3 9
Dogmatism is a term redolent with insinuation. It has been used by
social psychologists to characterize the phenomenon of rigid and intol-
erant thinking often attributed to political extremists.40 Schubert cites
this literature as proof that dogmatism/non-dogmatism is an important
dimension in all thought-including judicial decision. Even if the
attitude of rigid intolerance were precisely identifiable, which other
social psychologists have questioned,41 it would be no authority for
Schubert. He uses the word not to mean intolerance, but to mean sup-
port of government against private interests, demonstrated both by
opposition to economic underdogs and by supporting state action chat-
37. SCHUBERT, tables 26 and 27, at 172-73.
38. Id. 199-203.
39. Id. 257-59.
40. The two leading studies to which Schubert refers are H. EYSENcx, Tim PsycitotooY
oF Potrrics (1954) and M. ROKEACH, THE OPEN AND CLOSED MIND (1960).
41, E.g., Rokeach and Hanley, Eysenck's TenderMindednets Dimension: A Critique,
53 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLE1E.4 165 (1956); RoGER BROWN, SOCIAL PsYcoLoGY 477. 540 (1965).
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lenging political rights. Nothing in the literature of social psychology
demonstrates that an ideology which favors state authority is necessarily
rigid, intolerant, or authoritarian. Nonetheless, Schubert "assumes"
that it must be, and feels free to assume further that pragmatism/
dogmatism is the second most important variable of judicial decision.
Having asserted that it is dogmatic to be a statist, he changes the mean-
ing of dogmatism a second time; now it is a distaste for overturning
leading cases. "I think it requires no argument," says Schubert (thus
sparing himself a Herculean task), "to support the judgment that to
believe in the authority of precedent, that rules should be followed
until they are formally changed, etc., corresponds with the Dogmatic
ideology. . . .So Dogmatism is pro-stare decisis, and Pragmatism is
anti-stare decisis."43 After all this Schubert measures the Justices' C and
E scale ranks against the hypothesized dogmatism dimension and finds
that not a single one is a dogmatist-a triumphant conclusion.0 4
Even if the conjecture and unscientific assumptions of the second
half of The Judicial Mind are ignored, does the remainder represent
scientific analysis? It postulates a model of decision-making as stimulus,
attitude and response. But on that level the model is a truism incapable
of refutation: all behavior may be represented as a set of stimuli and
responses. What gives a model scientific standing is its potential for
being tested, for withstanding refutation. Only a fragment of Schubert's
model passes testing-the consistency of one of the two scale values.
The E scale does not meet the test of reproducibility, and the defining
assumptions of the C value are less reliable for explanation than the
traditional approach.
Schubert does use statistical techniques which may, but need not
necessarily, promote scientific inquiry. As he himself admits,
[O]nly persons who do not comprehend the methodology will
assume that once a scale has been constructed, it can serve as a
substitute for the judgment of the analyst about his data. As I
have tried to illustrate in various places in this work, scales and
coefficients and factors and other quantified paraphenalia are use-
ful guides to, but never substitutes for, the scientific intelligence
(i.e., uncommon sense) of the analyst .... 45
But it is just such "scientific" intelligence that is missing from
Schubert's book. The conceptual categories such as value and dogma-
tism are arbitrary and confused rather than "politically and psycho-
42. The "most important" is liberalism/consernatism. Scturnmr, 259, 265.
43. Id. 268.
44. Id. 260, 265.
45. Id. 169.
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logically shrewd; ' 4 6 the tests are not systematically applied, let alone
controlled. The statistics are used to generate hypotheses piecemeal,
not to test them.47 The scales do not prove that the Justices simply fol-
low their subjective attitudes without attention to legal doctrine.48
In sum, Schubert has his cake and keeps his penny. He is a scientist
without being responsible to the canons of scientific inference.40 He
is an intuitionist, but claims to be hard-nosed in some undefined sense
that the legal scholars he deprecates are not.50
Are the limitations of The Judicial Mind inevitable in any social
study of judicial decision or administration? I think not. Schubert
made two threshold but correctible mistakes. He underestimated the
sophistication, if not the adequacy, of existing explanations of judicial
decision-the place accorded values in explicit doctrine. He also started
with a methodology in search of a question, the reverse of a proper
research strategy. Schubert asked, "What mileage can I get out of atti-
tude scaling and factor analysis?" Instead he should have asked, "What
specifically is inadequate about present understandings of judicial deci-
sion, and how can I test this inadequacy?"
I do not share Schubert's view that present understandings of Su-
preme Court adjudication are "naive." Although the craftsmanship of
the Justices varies, they attempt to explain often complex decisions,
and sometimes succeed. The commentators and scholars who in turn
criticize the Justices' work bring a sensitivity and subtlety to the task
that is inevitably lost in a table which scales one value. Judicial value
analysis is far more likely to contribute understanding in a study of
baseline local and state courts. Written opinions are rare at this judicial
level, and the skills of judges and attorneys are uneven. Extended court-
room observation and statistical description may well reveal a disparity
between the values expressed in day-to-day dispositions and the values
expressed in the applicable law. Lawyers have yet to undertake this
task, partly because the data bits are so numerous as to defy analysis
with their skills. The task is a worthy challenge for judicial behavior-
alists applying statistical tools which can reduce the mass of data to
comprehensible dimensions. DOUGLAS RoSENTUALt
46. The quoted words are Westin's, supra note 5.
47. Jacob credits Schubert with valid teiting, supra note 5.
48. Grunbaum reports that such a proof is made, supra note 5.
49. A succinct statement of and argument for the canons of scientific inference termed,
by him, the "strong inference" method, are put forth in J. PLArr, Tim STEP TO MAN
19-36 (1966).
50. SCHUBERT 76.
t A.B. Yale University 1961; M.A. Columbia University 1963; LL.B. Yale University
1966.
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APPENDIX
SCHUBERT'S E ScAu-1957 Termt
Cases
3
CR = 1 -- = .989
265
6
CS = I- - = .902
61
th Across the top of each table, the Justices (last initials) are ordered from liberal on
the left to conservative on the right. Down the side of the tables are ranked all of the
cases which Schubert has determined raise each issue, from those which only receive a
single positive vote to those receiving only a single negative vote. The numbers in the
column are an abbreviated expression of the volume and page number of the published
opinion in United States Reports. The opinions for the October 1957 Term are reported
in Volumes 355, 556, and 357. Thus, 5/570 refers to United States v. Hvass, 355 U.S. 570
(1957). The x's in the tables are votes for the particular value. Blanks are negative votes
and asterisks show that the Justice did not participate in that case. For an explanation of
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E SCALE REPLICATION
Justices
Cases Br Bu BI C1 D Wa H Wh F
7/357 X X X
5/534 X X X
71235 X X X
6/421 X X X X X
6/412 X X X X X
5/426 X X X X X
5/131 X X X X X X
5/62 X X X X X X
6/342 X X X X X
7/221 X X X X X X
6/271 X X X X X X
6/1 X X X X X X
6/252 x x x x x x
6/282 X X X X X X
5/175 X X X X X X X
6/634 X X * X X X X
6/617 X X X X X X
7/155 X X X X X X X
6/326 X X X X X X X
6/41 X X X X X X X
6/320 X X X X X X X X
5/253 X X X X X X X X
5/83 X X X X X X X X
29 29
CR = 1 -- .836 CS = 1- -- .517
177 60
SCHUBERT'S C ScALE-1957 Term
Justices
Cases D Bl Wa Br F H Wh Bu CI
5/570 x
5/107 X X
7/549:561 X X X




5/66 X X X
5/233 X X X
6/405 X X X
7/371 X X X
6/44 X X X
6/464 X X X *
7/504 X X X
61148 X X X X
6/165 X X X X
6/390 X X X X
6/571 X X X X
7/185 X X X X
7/193 X X X X
7/386 X X X X
7/399 X X X X
7;433 X X X X
7 468 X X X X
5/155 X X X X X
5/184 X X X X X
6186 X X X X X
1444
Book Reviews
ScHmERT'S C ScA.-1957 TEPR, (Continued)
Justices
Cases D BI Wa Br F H AVh Bu CI
5/225 X X X X X
6/691 X X X X X X
7/214 X X X X * X X
5/392 X X X X X X
5/115 X X X X X
7/116 X X X X X
7/144 X X X X X
6/363 X X X X X X
6/660 X X X X X X
6/670 X X X X X X
7/348 X X X X X X
7/480 X X X X X X
7/576 X X X X X X
6/576 X X X X X X
5/80 X X X X X X X
6/560 X X X X X X X
7/301 X X X X X X X
7/493 X X X X X X X
7/573 X X X X X X X
6/129 X X X X X X X
5/313 X X X X X X X
7/513:483 X X X X X X X X
7/513:484 X X 0 X X X X X
7/545:382 X X 0 X X X X X
7/545:385 X X 0 X X X X X
7/568 X X 0 X X X X X
5/579:80 X X X X X X X X
5/579:141 x x x x x x x x
6/24 x x x x x x x x
17 17




Cases D BI Wa Br F H Wh Bu CI
5/107 X X
7/549 X X X
7/426 X X
7/371 X X X
5/66 X X X
5/233 X X X
6/44 x x X X
6/464 X X X 0
7/504 X X X 0
6/165 X X X X
6/390 X X X X
6/571 X X X X
6/185 X X X X
7/386 X X X X
6/198 X X X X
7/399 X X X X
7/433 X X X X
5/155 x x x x x
5/184 X X X X X
6/86 X X X X X
5/225 X X X X X
1445
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CR = 1 - - = .937
334
Justices
Br F H Wh Bu Cl
x x x
x x






x x x x
x x x x
x x x x
x x x x
x x x x
x x x x
x x x x
x x x x x
x x x x x
x x x
21
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